Prospective memory in autism: Theory and literature review by Sheppard, D.P. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/192370
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-06-01 and may be subject to
change.
The CliniCal neuropsyChologisT, 2018
Vol. 32, no. 5, 748–782
https://doi.org/10.1080/13854046.2018.1435823
Prospective memory in autism: theory and literature review
Daniel P. Shepparda, Jelle P. Bruinebergb, Anett Kretschmer-Trendowiczc and 
Mareike Altgassena 
aDonders institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, radboud university, nijmegen, The netherlands; 
bDepartment of philosophy, institute for logic, language and Computation, university of amsterdam, 
amsterdam, The netherlands; cDepartment of psychology, Technische universitaet Dresden, Dresden, 
germany
ABSTRACT
Objective: The current article set out to review all research conducted 
to date investigating prospective memory (PM) in autism. Method: 
All studies on PM in autism are first described, followed by a 
critical review and discussion of experimental findings within the 
multiprocess framework. PM in autism is then considered through 
an embodied predictive-coding account of autism. Results: Overall, 
despite somewhat inconsistent methodologies, a general deficit 
in PM in autism is observed, with evidence mostly in line with the 
multiprocess framework. That is, for tasks that are high in cognitive 
and attentional demand (e.g. time-based tasks; event-based cues of 
non-focality or low salience) PM performance of autistic participants is 
impaired. Building upon previous work in predictive-coding, and the 
way in which expected precision modulates attention, we postulate 
mechanisms that underpin PM and the potential deficits seen in 
autism. Furthermore, a unifying predictive-coding account of autism 
is extended under embodied predictive-coding models, to show how 
a predictive-coding impairment accounts not only for characteristic 
autistic difficulties, but also for commonly found differences in autistic 
movement. Conclusions: We show how differences in perception and 
action, core to the development of autism, lead directly to problems 
seen in PM. Using this link between movement and PM, we then put 
forward a number of holistic, embodied interventions to support PM 
in autism.
General introduction
Autism spectrum conditions (ASC; henceforth, autism) are characterized by impairments in 
social communication, restricted interests, and activities and, most recently, atypical reac-
tivity to sensory input (American Psychiatric Publishing [APA], 2013). The clinical picture and 
cognitive skills of autistic1 people may differ in severity (Hill, 2004). However, even autistic 
adults of average or above average cognitive ability find everyday life problematic (e.g. 
housekeeping, financial matters). They have, for example, difficulties obtaining and 
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maintaining employment that corresponds to their intellectual ability (Howlin, 1998) and 
coordinating social activities, e.g. organizing appointments with peers (Häußler, 2003) and 
living independently (Anderson, Shattuck, Cooper, Roux, & Wagner, 2014). Autistic children 
often have problems in school due to poor time management and organization, e.g. home-
work is often left at school (Mackinlay, Charman, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006). These apparent 
organizational difficulties in autism are supported by empirical work revealing problems 
with prioritizing, coordinating and sequencing activities and hence, with planning ahead 
(Mackinlay et al., 2006; Ozonoff et al., 2004); such difficulties have been related to deficits in 
prospective memory (Altgassen, Koban, & Kliegel, 2012; Mackinlay et al., 2006). PM describes 
the ability to remember to execute intentions after a delay at a certain time (time-based 
tasks; TBPM) or event (event-based PM tasks, EBPM, Einstein & McDaniel, 1996), such as 
remembering to go to the hairdresser at 3 pm, or to buy batteries in the corner shop on the 
way home. Many occupational and social demands require PM, and PM is essential for the 
development and maintenance of autonomy and independence. Frequent failures to remem-
ber to complete planned activities may endanger professional careers, social relationships 
or even impose serious risks on physical well-being (Kliegel, Jäger, Altgassen, & Shum, 2008).
Prospective remembering is complex, and comprises multiple processes and phases, 
across varying time-spans. First, the individual has to form the intention, and store it in 
(retrospective) memory while being engaged in other ongoing tasks (OT). This (filled) delay 
between encoding and retrieval of the intended action may range from seconds over min-
utes to several hours or days (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000). When the appropriate moment for 
intention initiation arises, other ongoing activities have to be inhibited and the individual 
has to switch to the prospective action and execute it as planned (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, 
& Einstein, 2002). Research differentiates between a prospective (remembering ‘that’ you 
have to do something) and a retrospective component (remembering ‘what’ and ‘when’). 
The prospective component is supported by attention demanding processes that are closely 
aligned with executive functioning which serve to monitor the environment for prospective 
cues (e.g. Smith & Bayen, 2004), inhibit performing the ongoing activity, and to switch to 
the prospective intention at the appropriate moment (Marsh, Hicks, & Watson, 2002; West, 
2011). The retrospective component supports the encoding and subsequent retrieval of the 
intention when a target stimulus is encountered and shares many processes with explicit 
episodic memory in recognition and cued-recall tasks (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Smith & 
Bayen, 2004; West & Krompinger, 2005). Recently, episodic future thinking, the ability to 
mentally simulate and thus pre-experience future events (Atance & O’Neill, 2001), has been 
linked to the intention formation phase (Altgassen et al., 2014). In line with these behavioral 
data, imaging studies indicate an involvement of frontal and medial-temporal structures in 
prospective remembering (for a recent review see Burgess, Gonen-Yaacovi, & Volle, 2011). 
Frontally mediated (executive control) processes seem to influence PM performance more 
strongly than temporally mediated (retrospective memory) processes (Brunfaut, 
Vanoverberghe, & d’Ydewalle, 2000; Kliegel, Eschen, & Thöne-Otto, 2004). Most recently, 
Cona, Bisiacchi, Sartori, and Scarpazza (2016; Cona, Scarpazza, Sartori, Moscovitch, & Bisiacchi, 
2015) further specified the underlying neural networks and involved cognitive processes in 
their ‘Attention to Delayed Intention’ model. Specifically, they state that a dorsal frontoparietal 
network supports top-down attentional and memory processes that are needed to monitor 
for the PM cue and to keep the intention in mind, whereas a ventral frontoparietal network 
(in addition to the insula and posterior cingulate cortex) is mainly involved in the retrieval 
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phase and supports bottom-up attentional processes (externally by the PM cue and internally 
by the mental representation of the PM cue and the intended action).
Importantly, different PM tasks vary in the extent to which they require these cognitive 
resources. TBPM tasks have been assumed to put higher demands on individuals’ executive 
control resources than event-based tasks; there is no external cue that may prompt retrieval 
of the intended action, and the individual has to actively keep track of the elapsing time 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). However, depending on the specific task features, EBPM tasks 
may also put high demands on executive control processes. Specifically, with regard to EBPM, 
two prominent conceptual models have been developed that allow for theory-based pre-
dictions on factors that determine the involvement of executive control in PM; namely the 
multiprocess framework2 (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) and the preparatory attention and mem-
ory processes theory (PAM, Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004). For the multiprocess framework, 
McDaniel and Einstein (2000) suggested a range of factors and contexts that can determine 
the extent to which an EBPM task invokes relatively effortful or automatic retrieval processes: 
task importance, the type of PM cue (e.g. salient vs. non-salient cues or cues that are more 
or less focal to the OT), the OT (e.g. more vs. less demanding), and individual differences (e.g. 
in cognitive resources, personality). Given that PM tasks are dual task situations consisting 
of an ongoing activity and the embedded PM task, both tasks compete for (limited) atten-
tional and executive control resources (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). Hence, characteristics of 
both task levels will affect the more or less controlled allocation of those resources (please 
see McDaniel, Umanath, Einstein, & Waldum, 2015, for a recent discussion of the multiprocess 
framework). In contrast, the PAM model posits that that all PM tasks require executive control 
resources for the PM cue to be detected, but that the extent to which these resources are 
needed depends on task characteristics.
Thus, there is good evidence that strong executive control, episodic memory, and future 
thinking abilities are critical for successful PM, particularly so when PM tasks involve, for 
example, cues of low salience or low focality (EBPM) that are difficult to detect, or no envi-
ronmental cues at all (TBPM). It is therefore of concern that problems with executive control 
and memory are well known in autism. Executive difficulties are typically seen in planning 
(Mackinlay et al., 2006; Ozonoff et al., 2004) and switching flexibly between different tasks 
or foci of attention (Corbett, Constantine, Hendren, Rocke, & Ozonoff, 2009; Kenworthy, Yerys, 
Anthony, & Wallace, 2008; Leung & Zakzanis, 2014; Ozonoff et al., 2004; but see Geurts, 
Corbett, & Solomon, 2009 for a critical review). Tasks assessing the inhibition of prepotent 
responses have resulted in more ambiguous findings (Corbett et al., 2009; Geurts, Verte, 
Oosterlaan, Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004; Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005; Pellicano et al., 
2017). Evidence from retrospective (episodic) memory studies indicate impairments in free 
recall tasks that provide little memory support (Bowler, Gardiner, Grice, & Saavalainen, 2000), 
whereas more structured tasks that put lower demands on self-initiated processing, such as 
cued recall and recognition tasks (Barth, Fein, & Waterhouse, 1995; Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 
2000), seem to be spared. In line with the well-documented deficits of autistic individuals 
in episodic memory and theory of mind (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Leekam & 
Perner, 1991; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; see Baron-Cohen, 2000 for a review), 
reduced episodic future thinking has been reported in autism (e.g. Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, 
Bowler, & Raber, 2014; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014; Terrett et al., 2013). It may be that 
these memory deficits are in some way related to impaired executive functioning, given the 
correlations found in other clinical populations between executive functions and episodic 
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memory (Baudic et al., 2006; Greene, Hodges, & Baddeley, 1995) as well as future thinking 
(de Vito et al., 2012)
Furthermore, it is possible that these executive functions, seen as important to PM, are 
driven by attentional processes (Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008; Posner & Rothbart, 2000), 
processes which have also been shown as impaired in autism (e.g. problems with disengage-
ment, Landry & Bryson, 2004) visual attention (Mann & Walker, 2003), joint attention (e.g. 
looking at or listening to people, Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003; Schultz, 2005), and 
reduced divided attention (Althaus, De Sonneville, Minderaa, Hensen, & Til, 1996; Ciesielski, 
Knight, Prince, Harris, & Handmaker, 1995) (cf. a review, Allen & Courchesne, 2001). Indeed, 
problems with attending to relevant sensory information have even been situated as core 
to autism (Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Van de Cruys, Van der Hallen, 
& Wagemans, 2017; Van de Cruys et al., 2014). Such problems would thus have a profound 
impact on PM performance in autism.
In summary, PM represents a ubiquitous daily process, critical to independent living. 
Successful execution of PM tasks requires the recruitment and coordination of several (socio) 
cognitive processes, processes that may rely fundamentally on effective attentional and 
executive control processes. Given the weight of evidence demonstrating autistic impair-
ment in such processes, and the potentially debilitating PM failures this may lead to, it is 
vital to better understand prospective remembering in autism, its underlying mechanisms 
and the environmental conditions that best support it.
Therefore, the first section of the current review will summarize all literature directly 
investigating PM in autism to date, arriving at the conclusion that, relative to the non-autistic 
population, PM in autism appears to be impaired. Then, in an attempt to better understand 
why autistic individuals in particular may demonstrate such difficulties, we will consider the 
complex dynamic nature of PM, the environment in which it is situated, and the demands 
this puts on individuals to coordinate and act under such an environment. With this in mind, 
we will build upon the cognitive explanations of the PM process offered by the multiprocess 
framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) by considering PM as embedded within a complex 
dynamic environment, and, as such, apply and further develop an existing account of autism, 
namely the Bayesian predictive-coding account of Van de Cruys et al. (2014, 2017). Finally, 
we will describe how this account, and the multiprocess framework, leads to useful, embod-
ied interventions, many of which are already widely implemented in practice.
PM in autism – literature review
A literature search was conducted on the Web of Science for all papers including the terms 
‘autism’ and ‘prospective memory’, in the title, published up until December 2016. The search 
returned 36 studies. After the inclusion of 2 of the current authors’ unpublished works, and 
subsequent screening, 13 studies were available for review (see Figure 1). The following 
section will review each of the studies, beginning with three studies demonstrating spared 
PM ability, followed by five studies demonstrating a PM deficit, and ending with five studies 
revealing mixed results (e.g. preserved EBPM but diminished TBPM). For brevity, the studies 
will only be summarized, with key points highlighted. A full description of the methods and 
results is presented in Table 1, but for an in-depth description and critique of all studies, 
including further statistical data (such as effect sizes), we refer to the recently published 
meta-analysis of Landsiedel, Williams, and Abbot-Smith (2017) on PM in autism. Finally, an 
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overall summary will be presented, describing patterns or commonalities evident between 
the studies to help elucidate variations in performance, and to discern possible cognitive 
functions that may contribute to the variation in PM performance.
Intact PM in autism
The three papers to find intact PM in autism investigated EBPM in children of around 10 years 
old (Altgassen, Schmitz-Hübsch, & Kliegel, 2010; Sheppard, Terrett, Rendell, & Altgassen, 
2017) and young adults (Altgassen & Koch, 2014). All three studies employed a typical 
Einstein–McDaniel computer-based EBPM paradigm in which participants first completed 
a single, computer-based task (OT). They were then informed they would work on the task 
again in the near future, but it would contain an additional task (PM), which they completed 
after a short, filled delay,
No main group effects for EBPM emerged, a result in support of intact EBPM in autism. 
With the exception of the ‘low salience’ condition in Sheppard et al. (2017), all PM cues were 
rather salient (distinctive, as compared to the OT) being either a change of target word color 
to blue (Altgassen & Koch, 2014), a change of border color from black to red (Sheppard 
et al., 2017) or a whole screen color change to yellow (Altgassen, Schmitz-Hübsch, & Kliegel, 
2010b). PM cues were focal for the Altgassen and Koch (2014) study non-focal for the other 
two studies.
No group effects were found in OT performance (differences in Altgassen & Koch, 2014; 
were limited by ceiling effects). Two studies showed adverse effects of the additional PM 
Figure 1. prisMa flow-chart (Moher, liberati, Tetzlaff, altman, & group, 2009) illustrating literature search 
process.
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task on OT performance, which is in line with the premised central role of the allocation of 
limited attentional resources in the PM process, as posited by the multiprocess framework. 
This notion was particularly supported by Sheppard et al. (2017) in that the costs to OT 
performance were significantly reduced when the additional PM task involved cues of high 
salience, and thus, facilitated more automatic (less attentionally demanding) retrieval 
processes.
A further result of note from the Sheppard et al. (2017) study involved their novel addition 
of an auditory cue (beep) condition. The PM hits were higher in this condition, for both 
groups, compared to the control condition, as they were for the visual salience condition. 
However, perhaps more interestingly, while both groups were also faster to respond in the 
visual salience condition, compared to the control condition, only the autistic group were 
also faster in the auditory condition. This was particularly interesting given that the autistic 
group, but not the control group, were reported to exhibit atypical and hypersensitive reac-
tivity to visual and auditory sensory information, as measured by the Short Sensory Profile 
(SSP; McIntosh, Miller, Shyu, & Dunn, 1999), a behavioral characteristic commonly seen in 
autism (Ashburner, Ziviani, & Rodger, 2008; Tomchek & Dunn, 2007).
Taken together, these three studies suggest that EBPM is intact in autism, while also 
identifying certain characteristics of the process, particularly cue salience, that may be of 
particular importance and benefit to the PM ability of autistic individuals. All studies 
employed simple and/or calibrated OTs, and focal and/or rather salient cues, which arguably 
resulted in a net reduction of cognitive load. In contrast to these papers, the studies discussed 
in the next section found impaired PM in autism, and employed EBPM and/or TBPM tasks.
Impaired PM in autism
Two of the studies to find impaired PM in autism investigated only TBPM (Altgassen, 
Sheppard, & Hendriks, 2017; Altgassen, Williams, Bölte, & Kliegel, 2009). Both studies 
employed a standard Einstein–McDaniel computer-based TBPM paradigm, the primary dif-
ference between versions being that participants press a button at given target times, rather 
than on presentation of a cue. Participants’ time-monitoring behavior is recorded as the 
frequency with which they check the clock (via key press), thought to be a measure of stra-
tegic, attention switching processes.
Overall, both studies saw TBPM deficits in autistic children and adolescents, compared 
to non-autistic controls. Furthermore, while all participants in both studies increased their 
time monitoring as the target time approached, the autistic participants in Altgassen et al. 
(2009) checked the time less frequently overall. While this time-monitoring behavior was 
spared in the autistic participants in Altgassen et al. (2017), the autistic participants of both 
studies appeared to check the time less frequently in the critical time interval closest to the 
target time, although this difference was only close to significance in the study of Altgassen 
et al. (2009, p = .06).
Altgassen et al. (2017) went further by investigating the role of motivation, manipulated 
via the PM instructions. Results revealed that performance was better for all participants of 
both groups in the ‘personal motivation’ condition (‘If you also manage to press this button 
every minute, you will receive 5 euros’), compared to the social (‘It would really help me out 
if you could remember to press this button every minute’) and the low (standard instruction) 
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motivation conditions; the performance within the latter two groups did not differ. Planned 
comparisons, however, revealed this effect to be driven by the control group only.
Regarding OT performance, controls in the Altgassen et al. (2009) study were more accu-
rate than autistic participants, while groups did not differ in response times. In contrast, 
there were no group differences in terms of accuracy in the Altgassen et al. (2017) study and 
autistic participants responded faster to OT stimuli than controls. Moreover, the cost to OT 
of the additional PM task, seen in both groups in Altgassen et al. (2017) was only evident in 
the control group in Altgassen et al. (2009).
Taken together, these results demonstrate that when PM tasks rely primarily on strategic 
retrieval processes (as is the case with TBPM), and comprise OTs with high demands on 
attentional control resources (visuo-spatial working memory task and two-back task, respec-
tively), autistic individuals perform less well than non-autistic controls. The lack of any moti-
vation effect on PM in the autistic participants could be a result of a general lower level of 
motivation for the tasks, possibly linked to a less-developed sense of self (discussed in more 
detail later in the current paper). However, given that OT performance was also impacted, 
and time monitoring was less frequent and/or less strategic, it may be that attentional 
resources were at capacity, rendering the ability of the manipulation to influence attention 
less effective.
However, reduced PM performance is also possible from EBPM paradigms, as demon-
strated by the studies of Brandimonte, Filippello, Coluccia, Altgassen, and Kliegel (2011) and 
Yi et al. (2014). While both studies saw impaired EBPM in the autistic group, they varied 
considerably in methodology. Brandimonte et al. (2011) employed a standard EBPM com-
puter-based paradigm and found the autistic children to respond slower, and with less suc-
cess, to the black and white PM target pictures than non-autistic controls. Yi et al. (2014), on 
the other hand, applied the same card-naming paradigm as employed in the landmark study 
of Kvavilashvili, Messer, and Ebdon (2001) in which young children named a stack of cards 
(OT), passing any cards that had a heart in one corner to the experimenter (PM). Yi and 
colleagues compared the performance of the autistic children to that of age-matched con-
trols and to ability-matched controls, with the latter group being significantly younger than 
the two other groups. Results showed that the autistic children remembered to pass signif-
icantly less PM target cards to the experimenter than both control groups, an indication 
that EBPM is difficult for young autistic children, even in the face of a very simple OT.
In contrast to the previously described EBPM studies that saw preserved PM in autistic 
participants, these studies included PM cues of arguably low salience (line drawings in same 
format as OT picture trials and a small red heart in the corner of a card, in the Brandimonte 
et al. (2011) and Yi et al. (2014) studies, respectively. Thus, the task of controlling attention, 
identifying the relevant cue and retrieving the intention was, according to the multiprocess 
framework, necessarily more strategic, placing higher demands on attentional control 
resources, likely compounded by the younger age of the participants (around 
eight-years-old).
The study described henceforth examined both TBPM and EBPM within one sample by 
way of the Dresden Breakfast Task (Altgassen et al., 2012), a task designed to assess PM ability 
under naturalistic conditions. Participants were required to prepare the table for breakfast 
for their three friends’ arrival. This was to be completed in a particular way, as per a given set 
of rules and a photograph, within seven minutes; participants were encouraged to plan their 
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actions beforehand. Four PM tasks were embedded within the main task: two EBPM, and 
two TBPM (also see Table 2 for a description of the main assessment techniques).
Analysis of the video-recorded performance of the participants revealed that controls 
outperformed the autistic participants in every measure of the Dresden Breakfast Task, other 
than switching. That is to say, controls were better at forming plans and adhering to them, 
adhering to rules, executing plans fully and effectively, and performing all TBPM and EBPM 
tasks. Furthermore, controls outperformed autistic participants on a standard laboratory PM 
task, and scored better at self-report and computer-based executive function measures. This 
study therefore provides evidence that, under complex and naturalistic conditions, which 
require participants to coordinate themselves and their execution of several tasks, either 
sequentially or in parallel, PM performance is severely impaired in autistic individuals, even 
for EBPM. However, this was the first study to investigate both TBPM and EBPM in the same 
sample under such conditions, and so it is useful to compare the results with a study with 
similarly complex and multitask demands, namely with one employing the Virtual Week 
(Kretschmer, Altgassen, Rendell, & Bölte, 2014).
Kretschmer et al. (2014) employed a computerized version of Virtual Week (also see Table 
2 for a description of the main assessment techniques), a board game that imitates daily PM 
task demands, originally devised by Rendell and Craik (2000). In brief, players roll virtual dice 
and move their tokens around the board a total of three times (three virtual days). When 
passing an event square, players must pick up a card and choose an activity from one of 
three options (e.g. have toast for breakfast), and are only permitted to move on once they 
roll the number corresponding to their chosen option (OT). EBPM and TBPM tasks are embed-
ded within the game, equally split into either ‘regular’ tasks (e.g. take medication at breakfast 
– EBPM), or ‘irregular’ tasks (e.g. call plumber at 5 pm – TBPM). To perform the task, players 
press the ‘perform task’ button, which presents the task within a list of (distractor) tasks. The 
virtual time, which is linked to the movement of the tokens on the board, can be seen on a 
digital clock produced on-screen via key press.
Half of all participants were assigned to an ‘implementation intention’ condition in which 
they repeated ‘if-then’ statements on presentation of the PM task, such as ‘when it is 5 pm I 
will press the “perform task” button and select “phone the number.”’ Implementation inten-
tions have been posited to strengthen the task-cue association, thereby increasing the prob-
ability that the retrieval of the task would be more automatically triggered by presentation 
of the cue (Gollwitzer, 1999). Indeed, much of the previous work on implementation inten-
tions in populations with reduced planning ability (e.g. older adults; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, 
Einstein, & Moor, 2007) has shown that this particular encoding strategy can be effective in 
improving PM performance (Chasteen, Park, & Schwarz, 2001), and so the authors hypoth-
esized that this may also be important for their autistic participants.
The autistic participants performed less well than non-autistic controls across all PM tasks, 
replicating the PM difficulties experienced by autistic participants in multitask conditions, 
as seen in (Altgassen et al., 2012). Both groups performed better on the regular tasks than 
the irregular tasks, and a group x regularity interaction revealed the autistic participants to 
have performed worse than controls on the irregular tasks. Surprisingly, the implementa-
tion-intentions did not benefit either group.
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PM in autism – mixed results
Thus far, studies reviewed have demonstrated either intact or impaired PM in autism, across 
both EBPM and TBPM paradigms. Three of the four following studies also included both 
event- and time-based cues, but, rather than showing a complete deficit, reveal only TBPM, 
but not EBPM deficits. The final study to be reviewed employed only a EBPM paradigm, but 
the results were mixed in that differences emerged between participants grouped according 
to a measure of autism severity. The first study discussed will be that of Henry et al. (2014) 
as it, like that of Kretschmer et al. (2014), employed the Virtual Week, but with children, rather 
than adults.
Other than participant age, the methodology employed by Henry et al. (2014) was much 
the same as Kretschmer et al. (2014), but was adapted to include tasks relevant to children. 
Also, rather than an implementation condition in this study, the authors included a ‘low OT 
absorption’ condition, which allowed children to move on from an event card with any dice 
roll, rather than the standard specific number; furthermore, participants were not required 
to move the token manually around the board as this was done automatically, further reduc-
ing overall cognitive demand.
In contrast to Kretschmer et al. (2014) the main group effect, whereby controls outper-
formed autistic participants, was qualified by a group by cue-type interaction, revealing that, 
while both groups performed better on EBPM than TBPM tasks, autistic participants only 
performed worse than controls on the TBPM tasks. This pattern was somewhat mirrored by 
a cue-type x regularity interaction, in that varying the regularity of the tasks did not result 
in differences in EBPM performance, but performance in irregular TBPM tasks was worse 
than that of the regular TBPM tasks.
This pattern again emerged in the studies by Williams, Boucher, Lind, and Jarrold (2013) 
and Williams, Jarrold, Grainger, and Lind (2014) which investigated both EBPM and TBPM in 
autistic children and autistic adults, respectively. In Williams et al. (2013) the PM of autistic 
children was investigated by way of an engaging computer game in which the children had 
to drive a car down a road, taking care to avoid obstacles and other vehicles (OT) while 
collecting gold coins (also see Table 2 for a description of the main assessment techniques). 
Using a within-subjects design, children’s PM was assessed across two separate sessions in 
which they either had to remember to press a certain key when passing a lorry (EBPM), or 
to refuel after 80s (TBPM). Performance in the TBPM condition was further supported by the 
fuel gage turning red with 20s to go. Upon a fail, the car would stop, the OT score would be 
reset to zero, and a reminder presented on screen of ‘Don’t forget to refuel!’. In a fashion 
similar to that of previous TBPM studies, participants could press a certain key to check the 
fuel level.
No differences emerged between groups in OT performance, with both groups perform-
ing similarly on the car driving game. The PM results, however, revealed a TBPM deficit, but 
not an EBPM deficit, in the autistic children, compared to non-autistic children. Furthermore, 
only the autistic children fared better in their EBPM performance compared to their TBPM 
performance, although some caution is needed with interpretation as the autistic children 
were at ceiling in the EBPM task. Fuel-monitoring behavior showed the expected linear 
increase toward the TBPM target time, for both groups, indicating that strategic monitoring 
was intact in this autism group. Interestingly, measures of cognitive flexibility and mentalizing 
did show impairments in the autistic group, but only autistic mentalizing was associated 
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with TBPM performance. The results of this study again confirmed that EBPM success is 
possible even for autistic children if PM cues are focal and salient; when external cues are 
absent, and strategic processes are necessary, as in TBPM tasks, performance may be 
impaired.
The study by Williams et al. (2014) found very similar results in autistic adults, though this 
was achieved using a more common computer-based paradigm. Specifically, participants 
had to remember to press a different key whenever a musical instrument appeared (EBPM) 
or every two minutes (TBPM), while judging whether the list presented on-screen was the 
same as the words previously presented one by one (OT). Again, participants could press a 
certain key at any moment to bring up a display of a digital clock.
With regard to OT performance, no group or cue differences emerged. With regard to PM 
accuracy, overall TBPM performance was worse than EBPM. Further, as in the previously 
described study, EBPM performance between the two groups was similar, whereas autistic 
TBPM performance was worse than that of controls. Analysis of the response precision of 
TBPM (i.e. the temporal distance to the target time) and the reaction time of the EBPM 
revealed no overall differences between TBPM and EBPM performance. However, the analysis 
did reveal that autistic participants were less precise in the TBPM task, but no slower in the 
EBPM task. The monitoring of the time did not differ between groups, showing the expected 
linear increase as the target time approached.
The final study to be summarized is that conducted by Sheppard, Kvavilashvili, and Ryder 
(2016), which investigated the relationship between autism symptom severity and PM per-
formance. To accomplish this, the study included a group severely autistic children (as cat-
egorized by the Childhood Autism Rating Scale – CARS; Schopler, Reichler, DeVellis, & Daly, 
1980), and adapted the methods (e.g. participant matching, task design) in novel ways 
accordingly. Children were engaged in three simple games, played with a hand puppet, 
which measured their EBPM. Recalling the puppet’s name provided a measure of RM.
The inclusion of severely autistic children proved an important aspect, as, overall, only 
the severe, and not the mild autism group demonstrated poorer PM than the non-autistic 
controls. A group × task interaction revealed, however, that, remarkably, the severely autistic 
children performed as well as the non-autistic children on the task that involved picking up 
a spring toy when leaving the room.
This study, therefore, suggests that variation in autistic symptoms, a common occurrence 
in a population well known for its heterogeneity (Jeste & Geschwind, 2014), plays an impor-
tant role PM performance. Furthermore, EBPM success is possible for severely autistic indi-
viduals if they are sufficiently motivated.
Literature summary and critique
At first glance, it is clear that very few of the reviewed investigations employed common 
methodologies. If, for instance, studies employed comparable age groups and OTs, they 
varied on cue-types and control variables, and yielded contrasting OT results (Altgassen 
et al., 2009 vs. Altgassen et al., 2010); if studies shared very similar paradigms, they varied 
on age group and yielded contrasting PM results (Kretschmer et al., 2014 vs. Henry et al., 
2014). The current literature could, therefore, be considered inconsistent and unreliable and, 
to an extent, this is true. Thus, to provide clarity and reliability, future research must endeavor 
to consistently replicate findings. Importantly, the recent meta-analysis and review by 
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Landsiedel et al. (2017) came to a similar conclusion as the current paper, finding a reliable 
TBPM impairment, and a small (although less reliable), EBPM impairment. With this in mind, 
the apparent methodological inconsistency could also be viewed as a strength in that, across 
a broad range of ages and methodologies, patterns have emerged that provide important 
insight into PM in autism.
Firstly, of the 19 experiments conducted across the 13 studies, which included participants 
ranging in age from 8 to 41, 14 (73.7%) revealed a PM deficit, compared to controls. More 
specifically, all 7 TBPM experiments, and 6 of the 12 EBPM experiments, were suggestive of 
PM impairment. Considering the consistent TBPM results, it seems clear that when autistic 
individuals cannot depend on any external cue, but must instead rely on internal signals 
and self-generated and initiated strategies, such as regularly switching attention and inhib-
iting action without prompt, PM tasks are particularly difficult. This notion is further sup-
ported by those studies (e.g. Brandimonte et al., 2011) that did not find any cost to the OT 
of adding the PM task, suggesting that attention was not successfully diverted from the OT 
in order to monitor for and execute the PM task. Difficulty with strategically allocating atten-
tional resources would also explain the poorer performance found in half of the EBPM studies; 
when cues were low in salience (e.g. Kretschmer et al., 2014) or non-focal (e.g. Yi et al., 2014), 
or the attention competing OT was high in cognitive demand (e.g. Altgassen et al., 2012, 
2017), then autistic performance suffered, compared to non-autistic controls. In contrast, 
however, when these factors were reversed, and so dependence on self-initiated strategy 
was reduced, and automatic retrieval facilitated, then PM performance was spared. This 
pattern of results thus supports the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).
When looking at the different phases of prospective remembering and keeping in mind 
the well-documented deficits of people with autism in attention, executive functioning, 
retrospective memory, and episodic future thinking, we expect to find reduced performance 
in virtually all phases of prospective remembering (namely, intention formation, intention 
retention, intention initiation and execution). So far, only one study on PM in autism has 
included a measure of intention formation (i.e. planning; Altgassen et al., 2012), and reported 
reduced autistic performance, and only one study tried to manipulate intention formation 
(i.e. implementation intentions; Kretschmer et al., 2014). All other studies have focused on 
the phases of intention initiation and execution (as has the vast majority of PM research in 
general), and have found the discussed mixed results (e.g. Henry et al., 2014; Sheppard et 
al., 2017) that are generally in line with the multiprocess framework. Intention retention has 
not been directly investigated, but first evidence points to retrospective memory load affect-
ing PM in autism. Specifically, Kretschmer et al.’s study reported reduced autistic deficits with 
regular PM tasks that put less demands on retrospective memory as compared to irregular 
tasks. Similarly, Henry et al. (2014) found larger autistic PM deficits for irregular TBPM tasks.
However, an important limitation of the reviewed PM studies is that all but one (Sheppard 
et al., 2016) include only mildly to moderately autistic participants, of average to above 
average IQ. The PM evidence does not therefore fully represent the autistic population, a 
population known for its heterogeneity (Masi, DeMayo, Glozier, & Guastella, 2017), which is, 
indeed, an issue across the autism literature. The study by Sheppard et al. (2016) does high-
light the importance of considering symptomatic variation in autism and how it relates to 
PM performance, revealing a difference in PM performance between ‘severely’ and ‘mildly’ 
autistic children. However, in this case, severity classification was made on the basis of a 
composite CARS score (Schopler et al., 1980), disguising the variation of behaviors that 
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contributed to the total score. Thus, while the Sheppard et al. (2016) paper was an important 
step in the (PM) autism literature, much more needs to be done to more accurately represent 
the population. Therefore, while symptom severity and other aspects of the heterogeneous 
condition may have contributed to the PM performances seen in the literature, caution is 
needed when generalizing the conclusions to the entire autism population.
Taken together, despite the heterogeneous methodology of the conducted studies, and 
the relative homogeneity of the participants, a pattern emerges that suggests autistic indi-
viduals will likely find PM tasks that demand a high level of attentional control and strategic 
processing, such as those involving multiple sub-tasks and/or cues of low salience, very 
difficult. These findings are in line with the everyday difficulties of people with autism with 
planning ahead, and the organization and coordination of (complex) activities.
In terms of improving PM performance and reducing everyday difficulties, reducing the 
cognitive/strategic demand of PM tasks by increasing the automaticity of retrieval processes, 
would almost certainly be of benefit to autistic individuals, indeed, to all populations. 
However, all PM and autism studies conducted so far, with exception of the Dresden Breakfast 
Task, employed typical laboratory-based tasks that provide high experimental control, but 
low ecological validity, and which may not be able to reflect the complexity of real-life tasks.
The dynamic characteristics of PM
In reality, daily tasks are significantly more complex than the scenarios presented in typical 
laboratory-based dual-task PM paradigms. For instance, some tasks will only involve a short 
delay, with few competing tasks and no social interaction, such as remembering to check 
out with an electronic travel card when alighting the bus after a short journey. In contrast, 
others will involve long delays and human interaction, in the face of several other tasks and 
social and cultural expectations, such as passing on a message to a friend at the end of a 
busy academic conference. Importantly, therefore, PM is a variable, multitask process which 
demands the fluid and dynamic control of attentional control resources to facilitate the 
integration and execution of all aforementioned PM-critical cognitive mechanisms, the exact 
calibration of which depends heavily on context. This between- and within-PM task variability 
is to some extent recognized by the recent dynamic multiprocess framework proposed by 
Scullin, McDaniel, and Shelton (2013), which argues for the need for dynamic utilization of 
automatic and strategic retrieval processes over time, given the temporal variability of PM 
demands. Therefore, in practice, while investigating discrete cognitive mechanisms, such as 
executive function (e.g. reducing switching and inhibition demands by increasing cue sali-
ence) provides some indication as to the role of that specific mechanism, it ignores the 
interrelated, systemic and social characteristics of the PM process. One further critical factor 
in the dynamic PM process is individual difference, that is, how individuals are variably 
equipped to function in such a complex environment, a factor particularly important to 
consider for the autistic population who are known for their cognitive and behavioral het-
erogeneity (Georgiades, Szatmari, & Boyle, 2013; Jeste & Geschwind, 2014).
Thus, to properly understand PM, and so devise the most effective interventions, it is 
important to consider any processes that may be fundamental to the development of the 
cognitive and behavioral functions needed for prospective remembering and their dynamic 
integration and utilization, while also recognizing the dynamic and contextual requirements 
of PM as demanded from an ever changing physical and social environment. With this in 
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mind, the following section will briefly examine the potentially fundamental role of predictive 
coding in the PM process. Furthermore, via the predictive-coding account of account by Van 
de Cruys et al. (2014), we will show how these predictive-coding deficits that may be primary 
to autism would result in the cognitive and PM deficits seen in the literature.
In recognition of the dynamic agent–environment interactions inherent to PM, we extend 
the role of predictive coding in PM, and the account of autism, to not just include perception, 
but also movement and affect, as is the case in predictive models formulated under active 
inference (Clark, 2015; Joffily & Coricelli, 2013; Kiverstein & Miller, 2015; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & 
Friston, 2015). In this way, the notions put forward in the current paper will shed light not 
only on processes fundamental to PM, but also on the underlying causes of autism. In addi-
tion, by better understanding fundamental atypicalities in perception, action and movement, 
the development of better targeted interventions is supported that not only improve daily 
PM performance, but also inform clinical practice and help target specific learning to improve 
autistic individuals’ lives as a whole.
A unifying predictive-coding account of autism
Simply described, predictive coding is an account of perception in which the main task of 
the perceptual system is to minimize the prediction-error between predicted and actual 
sensory input (Clark, 2013; Rao & Ballard, 1999). Under this account, the brain continuously 
generates predictions about future incoming sensory information (top-down), based on the 
current context and associated prior experiences, which are subsequently compared with 
input received (bottom-up). While predictions serve to minimize prediction-error, a resulting 
prediction-error can be used to optimize the prediction, which in turn minimizes predic-
tion-error, a process that cycles in perpetuity. Through prediction-errors and their minimi-
zation, the brain gradually comes to learn the statistical structure of the environment, i.e. 
how distal structures in the environment give rise to proximal sensory input (for more 
detailed introductory accounts to predictive coding, see Clark, 2013, 2015; Hohwy, 2013).
However, as Van de Cruys et al. (2014) note, due to the ‘fluctuating nature of regularities 
in the world, and the stochastic and noisy biological system through which we experience 
it […]’ (p.1) there is a limit to what can be predicted and hence there will always be some 
residual prediction-error. Therefore, a critical ability is to learn which prediction-errors are 
behaviorally relevant, and so should be attended to and used to update predictions, and 
which can be ignored.
For instance, upon entering a café, one may be surprised by the weight of the door when 
opening. This is a useful prediction-error, and should update the future prediction of that 
particular door. Once inside, one would expect, and so predict, to hear the sound of the milk 
steaming machine. If a familiar café, one would even be able to predict well the location of 
the sound, and have some idea of the sound’s particular characteristics. However, it would 
be practically impossible to predict the exact time, and the exact volume and clarity as 
experienced by the perceiver (influenced, for example, by talking, head cold, a particularly 
loud/busy moment). Therefore, the sound of the steam machine would almost always gen-
erate an error. However, this error could never be reduced and should thus receive minimal 
attention, and should not update the model of what to expect in a café; that is, nothing 
further could be learnt from this experience (irreducible uncertainty, Van de Cruys et al. 
(2014), so the error should be assigned low confidence (precision) that it is attention worthy. 
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Thus, within an optimal prediction model of a steam machine in a café, the occurrence of 
the sound at any given moment will essentially be surprising, but not unexpected.
Clearly, then, being able to flexibly and context-sensitively vary the precision of predic-
tion-errors is critical for optimal learning and attention allocation (Feldman & Friston, 2010). 
An understanding of the errors that still offer reducible uncertainty facilitates the efficient 
direction of attention toward errors that can be further reduced, i.e. real learning opportu-
nities. Conversely, assigning equal and high weight to each and every error would result in 
attention being drawn to errors which will always occur and cannot be reduced, thus deplet-
ing valuable and limited cognitive processing power, and needlessly updating prediction 
models. Precision, therefore, is seen as the fundamental mechanism of learning and attention 
(Van de Cruys et al., 2014) and has a clear and important role in PM.
If, as posited by the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) the allocation 
of attentional resources is central to the PM process, then an optimum precision weighting 
mechanism is essential to successful PM performance. Selectively attending to relevant 
information and ignoring the high volume of other information would facilitate time mon-
itoring, or the monitoring for and identification of PM cues (particularly for those of low 
salience and non-focality), or the switching of attention from one task to another. Furthermore, 
attenuating the relentless barrage of irrelevant sensory information is important for the 
development and application of other, higher level cognitive processes critical to PM, such 
as planning, retrospective memory, episodic future thinking and critical thinking and rea-
soning (regarding, say, the context and environment within which the PM is likely to be 
situated).
Using the previous example of a café, it is easy to see the importance of precision to PM. 
One would rely on the high-level concept of a café to form a ‘café-prediction’, from which 
one would expect, and thus assign low precision to, the tumultuous stream of relatively 
lower level errors (e.g. sudden bursts of laughter, or cups being dropped to the floor) allowing 
them to be ignored within (and thus not update) my ‘café-prediction’ model. This would free 
up attentional resources, which would be particularly important for demanding PM tasks 
within the café, such as monitoring the time in order to call your boss at a certain time, or 
to monitor for a cue indicating your coffee is ready, after which you might stop your conver-
sation (OT) and pick up the coffee which has been placed at the end of the counter.
Pertinently for the current review, Van de Cruys et al. (2014), in their unifying account of 
autism, put forward the selective and contextual weighting of precision, a mechanism essen-
tial to attentional control and so to PM, as the core deficit of the condition. Specifically, they 
situate the core deficit in the High, Inflexible Precision of Prediction-Errors in Autism (HIPPEA). 
This means that impaired precision allocation results in attention often being drawn to what 
is effectively noise, thus demanding valuable and limited cognitive resources, drawing atten-
tion away from real and important learning opportunities, and needlessly updating predic-
tion models. The authors posit that this uniformly high precision, irrespective of context, 
accounts for the characteristic impairments and difficulties commonly seen in autism, such 
as atypical sensory processing (Ashburner et al., 2008; Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Robertson & 
Baron-Cohen, 2017; Tomchek & Dunn, 2007), social communication difficulties, and insistence 
on sameness and repetitive behaviors, as efforts to reduce confusing and unpleasant envi-
ronmental uncertainty (American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013). Specifically, high sensory 
precision may result in a constant barrage of seemingly unfamiliar, attention grabbing sig-
nals, each of which would arguably be at best surprising and distracting; at worst, shocking 
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and frightening. Importantly, prediction itself is not impaired in autism, as is evidenced by 
superior performance in situations with high consistency and predictability, for example in 
structured visual search tasks (O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001).
Assuming the validity of the Van de Cruys et al. (2014) account, the deficit of HIPPEA leads 
directly to the PM impairments seen in the population. It would explain, for example, poor 
PM performance, relative to non-autistic participants, when PM cues were low in salience 
(e.g. high precision attributed to each and every error would result in all sensory input being 
‘salient’ and deserving of attention). This would load heavily on limited cognitive resources, 
and would also diffuse the relevance and contextual salience of the PM cue, making it much 
harder to discern. Thus, the predictive-coding account of Van de Cruys arguably contributes 
much to the understanding of autism, and to PM. An important potential criticism of the 
account, however, may be that, so far, much of the literature has been mainly theoretical 
and conceptual in nature, dealing with autism using the tools and concepts derived from 
predictive coding and provides therefore nothing more than stories (Bowers & Davis, 2012). 
Although the unification of a disparate range of impairments under one theory is progress 
in its own right, we agree that much further work is needed. In particular, the development 
of quantitative computational models that are able to make predictions about updating, 
learning, and the adjustment of precision on a trial-by-trial basis (Van de Cruys et al., 2017), 
would greatly advance the field. For example, the aim of the rapidly emerging field of com-
putational psychiatry is to infer the hidden causes (such as the structure of the parameters 
of an internal model) of measurable quantities (such as actions, reaction times and symp-
toms; Friston, Stephan, Montague, & Dolan, 2014; Schwartenbeck & Friston, 2016; Stephan 
& Mathys, 2014). Furthermore, in their recent paper, Van de Cruys et al. (2017) put forward 
substantial empirical data in support of their account.
So far, we have only focused on the perceptual aspect of prediction-error minimization. 
However, PM does not simply involve the perception and processing of external sensory 
signals. Rather, it is a complex process that depends critically on perception and action. 
Specifically, it requires the effective coordination of the mind (perception, desires, intentions), 
the body (bodily sensations, action) and the environment (PM cues and/or target times; 
social or occupational expectations; competing sensory and social demands for attention) 
to ensure successful action at the appropriate moment. Consequently, to fully relate predic-
tive coding to PM and to autism, we need to extend HIPPEA to more embodied predic-
tive-coding models derived from active inference (Bruineberg, Kiverstein, & Rietveld, 2016; 
Pezzulo et al., 2015; Seth, 2013).
According to active inference, action, as well as perception, is integral to the predic-
tive-coding and error minimization process. That is, agents do not only try to predict the 
current state of the environment, but also cause their environment to be in an optimal state 
(i.e. a state of physical, social and cultural well-being/safety) through action. For example, 
according to active inference, ‘intending to post an important letter in a post box’ works like 
determining the need of posting a letter, expecting oneself (with high precision) to post the 
letter and then selecting an action (reaching into a bag, grasping the letter, then posting it 
through the slit in the post box) that fulfils that expectation. Only if an agent has the right 
predictions (both about what will be an optimal state, and about how it can reach that state), 
it can cause the environment to confirm to those expectations and consequently lead to an 
actually optimal state beneficial to the agent (Bruineberg et al., 2016).
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Put in more concrete terms, for individuals to flourish in their environment, they must 
understand their needs in terms of their physical and mental well-being (expected states), 
and meet them by perceiving and acting upon the environment in an as efficient and ben-
eficial way as possible. This includes among others the congruency of the sensory weighting 
of prediction-error (precision) with the volatility of the environment and the trade-off 
between action and perception (Palmer, Lawson, & Hohwy, 2017). Therefore, the role of 
prediction-error minimization, and the impact of any impairment such as HIPPEA, becomes 
much more significant, as it mediates all interactions between the brain, the body, and the 
environment within and between all hierarchical levels (i.e. low-level stimulus to high level 
concepts/abstractions), facilitating understanding of the self and the world in which it is 
situated. Active inference and error minimization is therefore deeply interwoven into every-
day processes, not least the PM process.
Given then, the essential role of prediction and error precision in mediating the relation-
ships between the brain, the body, and the environment, the adverse consequence of 
HIPPEA, the precision-weighting deficit put forward as core to autism (Van de Cruys et al., 
2014, 2017) already deemed significant to PM, becomes much more problematic. It means 
that autism is not solely a problem of perceptual evidence accumulation, but involves deficits 
in the interactions between all levels and modalities (e.g. between simple, sensory signals 
and higher level conceptual/constructed beliefs), between the brain and body, and the ways 
they coordinate to respond and act upon the environment. Thus, HIPPEA makes a whole 
range of other autism phenomena intelligible such as their difficulties with understanding 
internal states, evidenced by a high prevalence of alexithymia (Milosavljevic et al., 2016), 
difficulties with interoception (Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016), differences in rhythm and 
timing (Isenhower et al., 2012; Sheridan & McAuley, 1997), movement and associated social 
difficulties (Cook, 2016; Cook, Blakemore, & Press, 2013), and diminished sense of agency 
(Grynszpan et al., 2012; Sperduti, Pieron, Leboyer, & Zalla, 2014; Zalla, Miele, Leboyer, & 
Metcalfe, 2015), linked to deficits in episodic memory and episodic future thinking (Lind, 
2010). We think that extending the unifying account of autism of Van de Cruys et al. (2014) 
in such an embodied way, brings the account closer to more embodied unifying accounts 
of autism such as the one offered by De Jaegher (2015) which places differences in move-
ment, rhythm and coordination, between the self, others and environment as responsible 
for the emergence of autism. Thus, the embodied HIPPEA and enactive accounts of autism 
both describe systematic differences in movement and perception that ultimately blend 
with a different conceptual and social understanding of the environment; indeed, a different 
way of making sense of the world. We feel that together, both accounts offer a more encom-
passing account of autism. Furthermore, the difficulties caused by such as account would 
greatly impact upon PM performance.
PM tasks reflect one aspect of the fundamental real-world demand of navigating a com-
plex physical, social and cultural environment, and so require the efficient coordination of 
the brain, body, and environment to remain in a state of well-being. For example, the 
environment will create PM demands (work supervisor asks you to pass on important infor-
mation to a work colleague), generating intentions within the individual (pass message on 
to colleague). This intention is internalized in terms of relative value (need to please super-
visor; consequence for colleague of not receiving message; likely personal emotional state 
– personal, physical and social consequences of success/failure) which would interact with 
chances of success (beliefs about own ability to successfully execute task, given likely future 
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context in which task/cue is situated, and predicted ability to employ appropriate action 
within it; see Figure 2). These states are accompanied by physiological responses (increased 
heart rate, adrenaline/cortisol) and associated affective responses (arousal, worry, stress) 
that would need to be understood in the context of their situatedness in a socio-cultural 
setting. In addition, successfully realizing the PM task requires understanding how attentional 
resources are employed to perceive relevant cues (recalling my supervisor’s request upon 
seeing my colleague). What is crucial then, is for the agent to be selectively perturbed by 
aspects of the environment (change your behavior when seeing your colleague, but try to 
not get distracted by your phone) in a way that is in line with longer term plans and goals 
and the demands of the situation (such as your supervisor’s request). Such selective openness 
to aspects of the environment (or ‘affordances’) and coordinating with them in an adequate 
way represents a process fundamental to life and mind (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014).
Seeing PM as reflecting this fundamental life processes means that interventions aimed 
at addressing issues that may be affecting such life processes (e.g. HIPPEA in embodied 
predictive coding) would also benefit PM performance.
Clinical application
According to HIPPEA (Van de Cruys et al., 2014, 2017), autism emerges primarily from an 
impaired prediction-error precision weighting process, resulting in and manifesting as 
sub-optimal learning and attentional mechanisms. When considered in the context of active 
inference and the brain–body–environment system, HIPPEA would disrupt the critical con-
tinuous and reciprocal learning between all three states of the system, resulting in impaired 
communication and understanding between the brain and the body, and their perception 
and action in and with the environment. Given these assumptions, autistic individuals would 
benefit from holistic and embodied interventions that would support them in attending to 
and engaging with themselves and the world, which would in turn support their PM 
performance.
Figure 2. Diagram depicting the role of predictive processing in mediating between the brain, body, 
and environment throughout the prospective memory process. illustrates importance of attending to 
relevant cues (solid arrows), via effective precision-weighting, against a barrage of competing, often 
task-irrelevant, information (dashed arrows).
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As posited by the above assumptions, autistic people experience difficulty in perceiving 
and acting in the often irreducibly uncertain world. One obvious way in which to support 
such a difficulty is to reduce the irreducible uncertainty as much as possible, and provide 
predictable clear expectations and a safe physical, social, and cultural environment. This 
provision of clear, consistent structure, and expectation in the environment is the core prin-
cipal of the Treatment and Education of Autistic and related Communication-handicapped 
Children approach (TEACCH; Mesibov, Shea, & Schopler, 2004) which is widely implemented 
within charities and schools and has good levels of reported effectiveness (Mesibov & Shea, 
2010; Panerai, Ferrante, & Zingale, 2002). According to TEACCH, schools/environments should 
provide autistic individuals with as predictable and ‘low arousal’ physical environments as 
possible, for example, low sensory input and similar classroom configuration across all classes 
(e.g. same furniture, consistently arranged and decorated display boards, neutral colors). 
Reducing the uncertainty in the environment would not only reduce anxiety but would 
provide a safe, predictable platform from which to learn. These TEACCH principles could also 
be directly applied to the PM environment: reducing the physical and social uncertainty in 
the environment parallels the reduction in cognitive load inferred to be beneficial in empirical 
PM work (e.g. use of salient cues, simple OT). Providing clear PM instructions that are addi-
tionally supported by visual cues, could enhance encoding and increase the physical/per-
ceptual salience of the cue, thus decreasing executive control demands by increasing 
automaticity of intention retrieval. To increase effectiveness, this approach could easily be 
incorporated into a person’s existing communication strategy. For instance, an autistic child’s 
tailored Picture Exchange Communication System (PECS; Bondy & Frost, 1994) could be 
employed to provide need-appropriate verbal and visual task instructions when supporting 
them in bringing their sports kit to school the following day. The relevant symbols could be 
placed on the appropriate day on the child’s daily visual timetable, with copies taken home 
on the day to act as salient PM cues.
Furthermore, if autism is indeed associated with sub-optimal attentional processes, which 
may result in difficulties attending to relevant and important cues (internal and external), 
autistic individuals may benefit from interventions that focus on practicing and training 
attention. For example, the program Attention Autism (Dawson et al., 2004), originally devel-
oped to support the development of joint attention, has been found to improve attention 
by providing engaging sensory objects. This intervention would thus support the general 
development of the understanding to engage with relevant cues in the environment, cues 
which afford personal and social benefits. The benefit to PM of improving attention by way 
of interventions such as Attention Autism (Dawson et al., 2004) is thus clear: the ability to 
identify, and allocate attention toward, appropriate event-based cues in a complex environ-
ment would be developed, facilitating more frequent automatic retrieval.
A further method of improving self and internal understanding and the relationship with 
the environment – or the brain–body–environment system – would be to facilitate impaired 
learning through interventions that involve the use and coordination of all three of these 
states. Moving, acting and perceiving to achieve internal (fun, pleasure) and external (social 
interaction, PM tasks) goals, and post-action perception and reflection on the internal (emo-
tions, feelings, bodily responses) and external (effective communication, understanding 
others’ behavior, successfully executing a PM task) physical and social results, would support 
the understanding of one’s own function in one’s physical and social environment, and 
improve PM performance at every phase. One would slowly become more attuned to one’s 
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own body and its responses and actions within its environment. Examples for such embod-
ied/enactive approaches are movement (for a review, see Lee, Lambert, Wittich, Kehayia, & 
Park, 2016), drama (Corbett et al., 2011), music (Whipple, 2004), and art therapies (Koch, 
Mehl, Sobanski, Sieber, & Fuchs, 2014) that are currently already employed to support autistic 
people.
The approaches described above can be incorporated to generate more concrete, 
PM-specific support and learning strategies. One approach would be to augment the largely 
non-conscious, impaired embodied predictive coding and error weighting processes that 
are involved at every PM phase, with explicit, metacognitive processes. Metacognition has 
been shown to be important in PM, suggesting, for example, that attention-allocation strat-
egies depend somewhat on metacognitive expectations of the PM task demands (Rummel 
& Meiser, 2013), and an awareness of one’s cognitive difficulties may encourage the use of 
reminders to make sure one does not forget the implementation of the delayed intention 
(Gilbert, 2015; Phillips, Henry, & Martin, 2008). Although, interestingly, a recent study by 
Cherkaoui and Gilbert (2017) found that autistic participants gave good metacognitive judg-
ments of their (poorer) PM abilities and predictions of performance, but did not compensate 
with an increased use of reminders. It may be that the autistic participants differed only in 
their metacognitive control, but not awareness, in line with the, albeit scarce, literature 
pointing to difficulties autism in metacognitive control, and to deficits in using monitoring 
processes to influence cognitive control (for similar results see Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 
2016; Wilkinson, Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 2010; but see Wojcik, Allen, Brown, & Souchay, 
2011 for contrasting findings).
Given the benefit of metacognitive strategies to the learning of those who experience 
learning difficulties (Chevalier, Parrila, Ritchie, & Deacon, 2017) it may be that autistic indi-
viduals, indeed any individuals that experience PM difficulties, would benefit from training 
and support in the use of direct PM metacognitive strategies. Such training could be designed 
by drawing on the principles of TEACCH (Mesibov et al., 2004) to provide a highly structured, 
cyclical PM predict-perform-evaluate processes, scaffolded appropriately according to indi-
vidual cognitive and communication needs (e.g. the use of PECS symbols as mentioned 
above). Figure 3 provides an example of how this could be implemented in, for example, 
schools, to be completed by children with an appropriate level of adult support. Through 
this sheet, children would be encouraged to consciously consider a particular PM task, such 
as remembering their swimming kit, and why it is important to them. Children would also 
predict the likely environment in which the intention will be executed, how difficult it will 
be, what reminders or cues they will use and, ultimately, their likely chances of success. The 
children could then evaluate their predictions and performance, once the task was over, 
comparing them with what was experienced, informing future strategy and predictions for 
the same or similar tasks in the future. This cyclical process would augment the predictive 
processing problems we posit to adversely affect PM in autism, while also developing 
PM-specific, and more general, metacognitive ability. It would also have the added benefit 
of directly supporting the factors posited by the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000) to influence attention allocation and intention retrieval during the PM process 
(such as deeper intention encoding, stronger cue-action association, as well as highlighting 
cue salience and task importance).
To summarize, the findings of the PM and autism literature shows that making small 
changes to the PM environment, such as clearly demonstrating the value of completing the 
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task may improve PM performance. Such a demonstration might increase motivation, offset 
an impaired understanding of self and may improve PM performance by supporting inten-
tion encoding, shielding of the intention from PM-irrelevant stimuli, encouraging monitoring 
for the PM cue and enabling switching to the intended action. Furthermore, the salience of 
the cue, both in terms of the sensory distinctiveness as historically described by the PM 
literature, and in terms of its relevance to the task, may influence the extent to which retrieval 
of the intention relies on automatic vs. strategic, executive control processes.
Conclusion
The evidence from studies conducted to date strongly suggests that autistic individuals 
experience difficulty with PM. However, the few studies in which autistic PM performance 
was spared, even for severely autistic children, demonstrated that PM success is possible 
under very structured conditions, with simple OTs, highly salient, focal PM cues and moti-
vating rewards. According to the multiprocess framework, these conditions more automat-
ically encourage the allocation of attention toward PM cues, supporting intention retrieval 
and execution, and rely less on cognitive functions that are impaired in autism (e.g. executive 
functions, retrospective memory, episodic future thinking).
According to our proposed account of autism, the commonly found cognitive, social and 
motor deficits in autism are deeply underpinned by an impaired prediction-error weighting 
I have to remember to
I am good at remembering 
tasks like this
This task is important
to me because
I forget to do this task
very true 1 2 3 4 5 not true at all
rarely sometimes often every time
PREDICTION EVALUATION
I think this 
task will be
It might be difficult
to remember because
I can try and make
it easier by
To remind me
to do this
I will use:
Other reminder
I will remember
my swimming kit
very easy 1  2   3   4   5   very difficult
smart watch alarm 
iPad alarm  
definately 1  2   3   4   5   unlikely
Google Calendar alert
swimming symbol in bag
Did I remember?
This task was
I remembered / forgot
this task because
My reminders were
Because
Next time I will
Yes  No
very helpful  1   2   3   4   5   unhelpful
very easy  1   2   3   4   5   very difficult
Figure 3.  pM metacognition worksheet to support individuals with specific pM tasks. Metacognitive 
awareness and control would be developed by encouraging individuals to regularly predict and evaluate 
their pM performance, based on their understanding of self-pM ability, task importance, past performance, 
self-chosen reminders/cues, and the likely environment in which it will occur. levels of support, formatting, 
could be adapted to an individual need-appropriate level, e.g. full adult support, the use of symbols in 
place of words.
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ability. This impairment disrupts the development and understanding of the brain–body–
environment relationships and interactions, culminating in differences in the way that autistic 
people perceive, move, and make sense of the world. Thus, these differences fundamental 
to autism may lead to their problems with functioning successfully in the world, a critical 
aspect of which is successfully performing the frequent and challenging PM tasks. Therefore, 
while treating the ‘symptoms’ of poor PM performance by increasing, for example, cue sali-
ence and focality, is easily implemented and almost certain to result in better performance, 
we propose to directly address problems of prediction and action through embodied autism 
and PM research paradigms and interventions.
Notes
1.  We have used identity-first, rather than person-first, language throughout the paper in line 
with the preferences of the autism community (Kenny et al., 2015; Sinclair, 2013).
2.  The current paper will focus on the multiprocess framework as it is the theory most used by 
the reviewed studies.
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